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EXCUSING PROSPECTIVE AGENTS 
Cameron BOULT 
 
ABSTRACT: Blameless norm violation in young children is an underexplored 
phenomenon in epistemology. An understanding of it is important for accounting for 
the full range of normative standings at issue in debates about epistemic norms, and the 
internalism-externalism debate generally. More specifically, it is important for 
proponents of factive epistemic norms. I examine this phenomenon and put forward a 
positive proposal. I claim that we should think of the normative dimension of certain 
actions and attitudes of young children in terms of a kind of “prospective agency.” I 
argue that the most sophisticated account of exculpatory defenses in epistemology – due 
to Clayton Littlejohn – does not provide an adequate model for exculpatory defenses of 
prospective agents. The aim is not primarily to challenge Littlejohn. Rather, I engage 
with his framework as a way of setting up my positive proposal. I call it the “heuristic 
model.”  
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Introduction 
Blameless norm violation is a central topic in debates about the norm of belief, 
assertion, and practical reasoning. Proponents of factive norms of belief, assertion, 
and practical reasoning are particularly interested in blameless norm violation 
because there are many interesting cases in which agents violate putative factive 
norms but are clearly blameless.1 An adequate account of such cases is important 
for challenging more traditional approaches to epistemic justification – for 
example, approaches that equate justification with a kind of blamelessness.2 
Perhaps the most popular strategy in this respect is to draw a distinction between 
                                                                
1 When I speak of “factive epistemic norms” I have in mind any combination of the so-called 
knowledge or truth norms of belief, assertion, or practical reasoning. In the interest of taking a 
straightforward approach to a general issue, I think certain details about differences between 
these norms can be set to one side. However, for those who find this objectionable, my claims 
about “factive epistemic norms” can be read as pertaining only to the knowledge norm of belief.  
2 See William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Justification,” Philosophical 
Perspectives 2 (1988): 257-299, Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), and Matthias Steup, “A Defense of Internalism,” in The Theory of 
Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd Edition, ed. L. Pojman (Belmont: 
Wadsworth Publishing, 1999). 
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justifications and excuses, and to explain various norm-violating agents’ lack of 
justification in terms of excuses.  
One source of complexity for this project is the sheer variety of cases of 
epistemic blamelessness. Consider a few familiar ones:3  
 The New Evil Demon victim. 
 The Gettiered person. 
 The person who is just unlucky. 
 The member of a benighted community. 
 The brainwashed person. 
 The stroke victim. 
Some authors have argued that we cannot appeal to excuses to make sense 
of the blamelessness of agents in all types of cases.4 Whatever story we want to tell 
about what it takes to deserve an excuse in a given situation, it will not apply 
across the board in a unified or non ad hoc way. This might be plausible. But a 
couple of things should be said regardless. First, in addition to excuses, there are 
other types of exculpatory defenses. For example, recent work on the topic focuses 
on “exemptions” in addition to excuses. Second, this recent work aims to 
understand excuses and their relationship to exemptions in a principled way, such 
that a unified account of the above cases looks hopeful.5 
In this paper, I examine an additional kind of case: blameless norm violation 
in young children. This phenomenon has not been examined in much detail in 
epistemology.6 But it is significant in the present context. As I will explain, it is 
not clear that excuses or exemptions provide appropriate explanations of blameless 
violations of factive norms in this kind of case. To put it very briefly: excuses 
imply too much responsibility, while exemptions imply too little. Insofar as we are 
interested in defending factive epistemic norms, we need a more nuanced account 
                                                                
3 I will fill out the details of the cases that need filling out in the next section. For now, I rely on 
the reader’s familiarity.  
4 Mikkel Gerken, “Warrant and Action,” Synthese 178 (2011): 529-547. 
5 Clayton Littlejohn, “A Plea for Epistemic Excuses,” in The New Evil Demon, eds. F. Dorsch 
and J. Dutant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
6 One exception is Gerken, “Warrant and Action,” in which he challenges Keith DeRose’s appeal 
to “secondary propriety” in defense of the knowledge norm of assertion, in “Assertion, 
Knowledge, and Context,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 167-203. Gerken does not examine 
blameless norm violation in small children in detail. Rather, he is interested in this sort of case 
as a counterexample to DeRose.  
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of exculpatory defenses.7 In this paper, I put forward a positive account of 
blameless norm violation in young children. I call it the “heuristic model.” 
The basic idea behind the heuristic model is that excusing young children 
should be understood as part of more general familiar practice. This is the practice 
of treating young children like adults. Perhaps the simplest example of this is 
when we speak to young children in sophisticated vocabularies, knowing that 
they do not understand everything we say, or even very much of it. I will argue 
that doing so respects their “prospective agency.” It is a heuristic or method for 
training them into adult human agents. The idea behind the heuristic model is 
that appropriate exculpatory defenses of young children likewise respect their 
prospective agency.  
1. Contrasting Cases 
At one point, certain strong externalists – proponents of factive norms of belief, 
for example – responded to the New Evil Demon (NED) problem by arguing that, 
while the demon victim is not justified in believing that p, she is blameless for 
believing that p.8 The aim is to account for what the victim does right, despite 
failing to comply with factive epistemic norms. One objection to the blamelessness 
maneuver is that it’s too coarse-grained.9 There are different cases of blameless 
belief. Some of them have little in common with the NED case. For this reason, 
calling the demon victim blameless does not say enough. More specifically, it fails 
to provide an adequate account of what the victim does right which agents in the 
other cases clearly do not. To illustrate, consider a couple of cases from the list 
above in more detail:  
 NED: Dave is the victim of an evil demon who ensures that every empirical 
belief Dave forms is false, no matter how much evidence he has. Dave is the 
internal duplicate of an ordinary, epistemically blameless person. He 
continues to believe he has hands because it looks to him just like he has 
hands.  
                                                                
7 This paper simply assumes for sake of argument that at least some form of factive epistemic 
norm is plausible, or worth defending. 
8 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), and 
Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For 
the classic discussion of the NED problem, see Stewart Cohen, “Justification and Truth,” 
Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 279-295.  
9 Declan Smithies, “Epistemological Disjunctivism,” review of Epistemological Disjunctivism, by 
Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2012), January 2nd, 2013, Notre Dame Philosophical 
Reviews, and B.J.C Madison, “Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon,” Acta 
Analytica 29 (2014): 61-70.  
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 STROKE: Jim has recently suffered a severe stroke. His motor and cognitive 
skills have been severely impaired. In particular, his perception of ordinary 
objects has become highly unreliable. Whenever he is presented with a cup of 
coffee he mistakenly believes that it is bowl of soup.  
Dave and Jim each violate factive norms of belief. So, according to 
proponents of factive norms of belief, they are not justified. But it seems they are 
blameless for believing what they do. It also seems clear that they are blameless in 
different ways. For that reason we need to say more about each case. 
2. Justifications, Excuses, and Exemptions 
In perhaps the most sophisticated available account of exculpatory defenses in 
epistemology, Clayton Littlejohn draws on Peter Strawson’s10 “trichotomous 
scheme.” The basic idea is that there are three ways we ordinarily exculpate 
people: 
 Justifications: We show that the agent has a sufficient reason for φ-ing. 
 Excuses: We show that, while the agent does not have sufficient reason for φ-
ing, they manifest a kind of rational excellence, or a kind of right concern for 
the relevant reasons, in φ-ing.  
 Exemptions: We show that, while the agent does not have sufficient reason 
for φ-ing, the agent stands outside the realm of accountability in a general 
sort of way. 
The basic difference between excuses and exemptions comes down to the 
capacities or excellences which excused agents manifest, and which exempt agents 
do not (indeed, cannot). It is crucial to note that explaining the appropriateness of 
excuse defenses in terms of rational excellence – or in other words, in terms of the 
agent’s doing something commendable and positive – enables Littlejohn to 
respond to the worry that mere appeals to blamelessness do not do justice to what 
the NED victim does right, or well. By linking excuses to a kind of rational 
excellence, Littlejohn shows us how this sort of objection is misguided. Many of 
the commendable or positive things people feel inclined to say about NED victims 
are exactly the sort of thing Littlejohn claims explains why agents deserve an 
excuse (as opposed to an exemption, or a justification). As he puts it: “rationality is 
quite often a sign of excuse, not justification.”11 This feature of Littlejohn’s 
approach will be important below.  
                                                                
10 Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1952): 1-
25.  
11 Littlejohn, “A Plea for Epistemic Excuses,” 21. 
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For now, note that with the trichotomous scheme in mind, it looks like we 
can handle the variety of cases on the table. For example, it is natural to 
understand Dave as excused according to this way of thinking about excuses, and 
it is natural to understand Jim as exempt. Moreover, it seems we thereby account 
for these cases in a unified way. We exploit the relationship between two forms of 
exculpatory defenses familiar from ordinary life. As such, the framework provides 
a more fine-grained way of dealing with the NED problem.  
3. The Case of Young Children 
In this section I present another type of case and explain why I don’t think we 
should understand it in terms of justifications, excuses, or exemptions. Consider 
the following: 
 JUNIOR: Junior is a child of around 3 years old.12 He looks at a basket where 
the apples are usually kept and sees what happens to be a very convincing 
fake apple. He forms the belief that there is an apple in the basket. There are 
no apples in the basket.  
Junior violates factive norms of belief. So, according to proponents of factive 
norms of belief Junior is not justified in believing that there is an apple in the 
basket. But it is clear that he is blameless for believing that there is an apple in the 
basket. How, more specifically, should we understand Junior’s blamelessness? Is 
Junior exempt from the realm of accountability in a general sort of way? Does 
Junior have an excuse for believing that there is an apple in the basket? Let me 
explain why I think neither of these exculpatory defenses appropriately applies to 
Junior. 
Firstly, it is implausible that Junior deserves an exemption. The point can be 
made in terms of training. Because the epistemic community has an interest in 
training Junior to be a dependable member – a provider of actionable information, 
for example – it is implausible to employ the concept of an exemption to explain 
Junior’s blamelessness. This is because doing so is at odds with Junior’s prospects as 
an epistemic agent. The notion of exemption places agents outside the realm of 
accountability in a general, or global sort of way. Were Junior’s trainers to think of 
him as exempt, it would be difficult to make sense of their motivation to train 
him. 
More controversial is the idea that Junior does not deserve an excuse. But 
recall that, in contrast with exemptions, excuses are often appropriate when 
                                                                
12 There is a lot to consider in terms of exactly how young Junior needs to be. I am bracketing 
these details for the sake of getting a very general idea across. 
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agents manifest a kind of excellence in their rational capacities. That is, excuses 
are often appropriate when the agent manifests the right kind of concern for the 
relevant sorts of reasons. To be sure, it seems true that small children have at least 
some kind of rational capacity, and that Junior manifests this capacity when he 
forms the belief that there is an apple in the basket. Moreover, it can sound 
natural to say that a young child, in a given circumstance, “deserves an excuse” 
(even epistemically speaking). However, if we keep in mind Littlejohn’s restricted 
understanding of the connection between excuses and rational excellence, it is not 
obvious that excuses are the appropriate notion to appeal to in order to explain 
blameless norm violation in young children. Again, the point can be put in terms 
of training. Junior is still in the process of becoming an epistemically responsible 
agent. If Junior is fortunate enough to belong to an epistemically responsible 
community, his parents or guardians or teachers will be in the process of 
epistemically training Junior. They will be in the process of inculcating the habits 
characteristic of responsible inquiry, for example. In other words, when Junior 
goes wrong in a blameless way, there is an awkward tension involved in 
explaining this in terms of excuse. More precisely, there is a tension in explaining 
this with the restricted notion used to defend strong forms of externalism about 
epistemic justification (in the context of the NED problem, for example). 
It may be tempting, then, to suggest that this simply problematizes the 
restricted notion of excuse. However, it is worth pointing out a couple of things in 
response. Firstly, the role that the restricted notion plays in recent defenses of 
strong forms of externalism should not be underestimated. For many, it is a 
linchpin in the approach to dealing with more traditional worries about blameless 
norm violation.13 Secondly, at least one way of appealing to a less restricted notion 
of excuse won’t help with this case, either. What I have in mind is the following. 
Perhaps Junior deserves an excuse for believing that there is an apple in the basket 
because he is a child. The idea might be that he is excused for violating the norm 
of belief in this case, not because he manifests some kind of rational excellence, 
but rather because, as a child, laxer standards determine whether he is 
blameworthy for doing so. It may sound natural, but this idea is misleading for a 
couple of reasons. First, and most importantly, it misses the point of the case. The 
case is designed such that even an adult would be blameless for thinking there is 
                                                                
13 Littlejohn, “A Plea for Epistemic Excuses,” and Timothy Williamson, “Justifications, Excuses, 
and Sceptical Scenarios,” in The New Evil Demon, eds. Fabian Dorsch and Julien Dutant 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). For a different, but very closely related idea, 
see Duncan Pritchard, “Shadowlands,” in The New Evil Demon, eds. Fabian Dorsch and Julien 
Dutant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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an apple in the basket. Second, it would be a mistake to excuse Junior by appealing 
to the fact that he is a child because this undermines the idea that he needs an 
excuse in the first place. It effectively explains his blamelessness in terms of a lack 
of responsibility. This strikes me as equivalent to exempting Junior. And we have 
already seen why that is inappropriate.  
4. Prospective Agency and The Heuristic Model  
Regardless of whether or not there is some sense in which it is correct to excuse 
Junior, a more nuanced account of exculpatory defenses of young children is in 
order. That is to say, we need an account that differentiates Junior’s blamelessness 
from, say, Jim’s blamelessness in STROKE and Dave’s blamelessness in NED. It 
does not really matter for my purposes whether what follows is about a particular 
kind of excuse, or some other normative notion altogether. Whatever we call it, 
what matters is that the terms in our theory capture the full range of normative 
phenomena. 
How should we understand Junior’s blamelessness? I suggest that we draw 
on a familiar practice. To wit, we often treat small children as though they are 
adults. Perhaps the clearest example of this is when we talk to them in full-blown 
vocabularies, even when we know they do not understand everything we say. 
There are other intuitive examples, such as when we take children to places and 
events they couldn’t possibly understand (like museums, or concerts). This 
practice extends to punishment, which in turn interacts in interesting and 
complex ways with blame-responses. We punish young children, but we do not 
hold them morally responsible (at least not in the way we hold adults responsible). 
Importantly, however, the punishment of young children is not simply a kind of 
Pavlovian conditioning. It has genuine moral significance. Indeed, I suggest that 
one way of thinking about the relationship between punishment and blame-
responses towards young children is the following. We treat young children as 
“prospective agents.” We hold them responsible as a kind of heuristic or method 
aimed at turning them into adult moral agents. I won’t defend the empirical 
adequacy of this claim. I think it is a familiar enough idea for present purposes. 
My aim is to put it on the table as a way of thinking about our issue in 
epistemology.  
The idea is that we can extend this understanding of the relationship 
between punishment and moral blame-responses: young children are also 
prospective epistemic agents. We hold them epistemically responsible as a kind of 
heuristic or method aimed at turning them into adult human epistemic agents. 
What is important for present purposes is that the concept of an epistemic excuse 
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(in its useful restricted sense) does not appropriately apply to young children in 
this picture. This is because excuses (in the useful restricted sense) apply to agents 
who violate norms but nevertheless manifest a kind of rational excellence that 
prospective agents do not have. So, to fit with our modified notion of 
responsibility, we need a modified exculpatory concept. We need the heuristic 
model of exculpatory defense. To put it one way, we can understand blameless 
epistemic norm violation in small children in terms of the notion of a “proto-
excuse.”14 To return to JUNIOR, the basic idea is this. When Junior mistakenly 
believes that there is an apple in the basket, he violates factive norms of belief. 
According to supporters of factive norms, he is not justified in believing that there 
is an apple in the basket. But Junior is blameless. He deserves a proto-excuse. This 
is not something that Junior enjoys in virtue of manifesting any sort of full-blown 
rational excellence; nor does it place him outside of the realm of accountability 
altogether. It is a kind of exculpatory defense that reflects the practice of treating 
Junior as prospective agent.  
It may look like I am splitting hairs. So let me emphasize why this issue is 
important. For starters, there is potential here to make trouble for Littlejohn. And 
since his theory of epistemic excuses is the most sophisticated one on the market, 
that is already interesting. But the potential issue for Littlejohn is of secondary 
importance. Part of the reason for this is that it is not clear to me whether my 
proposal is in tension with Littlejohn’s framework. Indeed, if there is a dispute 
between us, it may be terminological; or perhaps the heuristic model simply 
compliments Littlejohn’s framework. Taking the latter approach, we might add to 
his framework in the following sort of way. We can list our categories of 
exculpatory defenses in a kind of descending order, where justifications imply the 
most robust type of blamelessness – a type that implies the fullest sort of 
responsible action/attitude – and exemptions imply the least robust type of 
blamelessness – a type that implies the thinnest sort of responsible action/attitude 
(indeed, the kind that is merely blameless).  
 Justifications 
 Excuses 
                                                                
14 I am not sure what the ordinary language term for the phenomenon I am targeting is. It seems 
likely to me that it’s simply “excuse.” This is fine for present purposes. It is widely 
acknowledged that excuses are a highly heterogeneous normative category (and thus “excuse” 
may even have a different meaning in different contexts). The name “proto-excuse,” on the 
present proposal, can simply be understood as a way of marking, for theoretical purposes, an 
important difference in kind between the restricted notion that, say, strong externalists are 
interested in, and what should be granted to Junior.  




In any case, what does matter, as I have suggested, is that our theory of 
exculpatory defenses accounts for the full-range of (relevant) normative 
phenomena. Whatever the best theory of exculpatory defenses in epistemology is, 
it should incorporate the heuristic model. An adequate understanding of blameless 
norm violation in young children ought to properly reflect our practice of treating 
young children as prospective agents.  
Another point is the significance of young children in another debate. 
Recently, some writers15 have pointed out that cases of knowledge by testimony in 
small children do not seem to involve the kind of credit that certain prominent 
theories require for knowledge – namely, reliabilist virtue epistemology.16 In this 
context, the “special” case of young children has enormous consequences. Indeed, 
mainstream epistemology is just starting to scratch the surface of the epistemically 
interesting social side of knowledge and justification. For example, the point about 
small children in the testimony debate is really a point about the (admittedly 
controversial) notion of “knowledge transmission.”17 If it occurs at all, knowledge 
transmission is an epistemically interesting phenomenon that extends beyond 
exchanges between adults and children. It seems to me that the case of young 
children in the present context is likewise just one example of a more general 
social-epistemic phenomenon. Prospective agency may be a pervasive, and 
perhaps even fluid or contextual phenomenon. For example, people recovering 
from serious cognitive impairments might be another important kind of case. If so, 
then prospective agency is a much wider phenomenon than I have space to 
explore here.  
Conclusion 
I have focused on the case of blameless norm violation in young children and 
argued that it places important constraints on our understanding of exculpatory 
defenses in epistemology. In particular, I have argued that it sits uncomfortably 
between excuses and exemptions as these appear in the most sophisticated 
epistemological work on this subject. To return to my brief slogan: excuses imply 
                                                                
15 Jennifer Lackey, “Norms of Assertion,” Noûs 41 (2007): 594-626. 
16 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and 
Ernest Sosa, Knowing Full Well (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
17 John Greco, “Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information,” in Epistemic Evaluation, 
eds. David Henderson and John Greco (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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too much responsibility, while exemptions imply too little. The heuristic model 
addresses this worry. I have left it open whether we should think of the foregoing 
as a problem for our most sophisticated understanding of exculpatory defenses in 
epistemology, or merely as a way of adding a further dimension to it. On a more 
general note, an exciting upshot has emerged. Getting clearer on blameless norm 
violation in young children forces us to get clearer on our understanding of the 
relationship between adults and children in epistemic communities, and the social 
nature of epistemic responsibility. And that is surely a project worth pursuing.18  
                                                                
18 Thanks to Harmen Ghijsen and Lani Watson for helpful discussion on earlier drafts of this 
paper.  
